

Literature for Advanced Microeconomics - 2023

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1 Decision theory: decision making under risk, uncertainty, and over time

Introduction: Chapter 1 in Mas-Colell et al. (1995); Chapters 8, 10, 14, 17 in Gilboa (2009)

Revealed preferences: Chambers and Echenique (2016), Rubinstein and Salant (2006), Manzini and Mariotti (2007), Masatlioglu et al. (2012), Chambers et al. (2017), De Clippel and Rozen (2021)

Risk and uncertainty: Kahneman and Tversky (1979), Tversky and Kahneman (1992), Klibanoff et al. (2005), Gilboa and Schmeidler (1995), Easley and Rustichini (1999), Dekel et al. (2001), Marinacci (2002), Halevy and Feltkamp (2005), Halevy (2007), Ahn (2008), Strzalecki (2011), Bordalo et al. (2013), Denti and Pomatto (2022)

Time preferences, flexibility, temptation, and self-control: Kreps (1979), Gul and Pesendorfer (2001), Sarver (2008), Bleichrodt et al. (2008), Fishburn and Rubinstein (1982)

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Stochastic choice: Chambers and Echenique (2016), Gul and Pesendorfer (2006), Ahn and Sarver (2013), Gul et al. (2014), Manzini and Mariotti (2014), Brady and Rehbeck (2016), Lu (2016), Kitamura and Stoye (2018), Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2019), Kovach and Tserenjigmid (2022)

Experiments on Belief Dependent Preferences, Guilt and Salience: Nielsen et al. (2021), Bellemare et al. (2018), Bellemare et al. (2019), Bellemare and Sebald (2022)

2 Game theory and strategic decision making

Game theory: Chapters 1, 2, 6, 11, 12 in Osborne and Rubinstein (1994), Osborne and Rubinstein (2003), Esponda and Pouzo (2016), Salant and Cherry (2020)

Mechanism design: Jackson (2014), Border and Sobel (1987), Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez (2003), Ben-Porath et al. (2014), Mailath and Postlewaite (1990), Hellwig (2003)

Student workshops on moral hazard, adverse selection and signalling: Bolton and Dewatripont (2005)

Example of empirical research based on microeconomic theory Nielsson and Steingrimsdottir (2018)

Auction theory: Krishna (2010), Myerson (1981), Pesendorfer and Swinkels (2000), Bulow and Klemperer (2002) Goeree and Offerman (2003), Burkett and Woodward (2020), Bergemann et al. (2022)

The theory of the firm: Grossman and Hart (1986), Levin (2003), Gans (2005), Hart and Moore (2008), Liu and Migrow (2022), Dosis and Sand-Zantman (2022)

How to write a referee report? Berk et al. (2017)

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