

Literature for Advanced Microeconomics - 2024

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1 Individual choice

Revealed preferences: Chapter 1 in Mas-Colell et al. (1995), Chapters 2 (up to and including Section 2.2) and 3 (up to and including Section 3.1) in Chambers and Echenique (2016), Masatlioglu and Ok (2005), Rubinstein and Salant (2006), Manzini and Mariotti (2007), Masatlioglu et al. (2012), Ok et al. (2015), Chambers et al. (2017), Nishimura et al. (2017), De Clippel and Rozen (2021), Dziewulski (2021)

Risk and uncertainty: Chapters 8, 10, 14, 17 in Gilboa (2009), Kahneman and Tversky (1979), Tversky and Kahneman (1992), Gilboa and Schmeidler (1995), Machina and Schmeidler (1992), Machina and Schmeidler (1995), Easley and Rustichini (1999), Klibanoff et al. (2005), Halevy (2007), Ahn (2008), Strzalecki (2011), Bordalo et al. (2012), Denti and Pomatto (2022)

Time preferences, flexibility, temptation, and self-control: Kreps and Porteus (1978), Kreps (1979), Fishburn and Rubinstein (1982), Epstein (1983) Epstein and Zin (1991), Laibson (1997), Dekel et al. (2001), Gul and Pesendorfer (2001), Gul and Pesendorfer (2004), Sarver (2008), Bleichrodt et al. (2008), Halevy (2015), Chakraborty et al. (2020)

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Stochastic choice: Chapter 7 in Chambers and Echenique (2016), Gul and Pesendorfer (2006), Ahn and Sarver (2013), Gul et al. (2014), Manzini and Mariotti (2014), Brady and Rehbeck (2016), Lu (2016), Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2019), Kovach and Tserenjigmid (2022), He and Natenzon (2022), He and Natenzon (2023), Fudenberg et al. (2015)

Experiments on Belief Dependent Preferences, Guilt and Salience: Nielsen et al. (2021), Bellemare et al. (2018), Bellemare et al. (2019), Bellemare and Sebald (2022)

2 Game theory and strategic decision making

Game theory: Chapters 1, 2, 6, 11, 12 in Osborne and Rubinstein (1994), Osborne and Rubinstein (2003), Esponda and Pouzo (2016), Salant and Cherry (2020)

Mechanism design: Jackson (2014), Border and Sobel (1987), Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez (2003), Ben-Porath et al. (2014), Mailath and Postlewaite (1990), Hellwig (2003), Sandoy (2023)

Moral hazard, adverse selection and signalling: Bolton and Dewatripont (2005)

Auction theory: Krishna (2010), Myerson (1981), Pesendorfer and Swinkels (2000), Bulow and Klemperer (2002) Goeree and Offerman (2003), Burkett and Woodward (2020), Atakan and Ekmekci (2021), Gershkov et al. (2021), Bergemann et al. (2022), Levin and Peck (2023)

The theory of the firm: Grossman and Hart (1986), Levin (2003), Gans (2005), Hart and Moore (2008), Hellmann and Thiele (2015), Hellmann and Thiele (2017), Watson et al. (2020), Liu and Migrow (2022)

How to write a referee report? Berk et al. (2017)

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