

Potential Presentations for Advanced Microeconomics - 2024

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1 Decision theory: decision making under risk, uncertainty, and over time

Revealed preferences: Rubinstein and Salant (2006), Manzini and Mariotti (2007), Masatlioglu et al. (2012), Chambers et al. (2017), De Clippel and Rozen (2021)

Risk and uncertainty: Gilboa and Schmeidler (1995), Easley and Rustichini (1999), Dekel et al. (2001), Marinacci (2002), Halevy and Feltkamp (2005), Halevy (2007), Ahn (2008), Strzalecki (2011), Bordalo et al. (2013), Denti and Pomatto (2022)

Time preferences, flexibility, temptation, and self-control: Kreps (1979), Gul and Pesendorfer (2001), Sarver (2008)

Stochastic choice: Ahn and Sarver (2013), Gul et al. (2014), Manzini and Mariotti (2014), Brady and Rehbeck (2016), Lu (2016), Apesteguia and Ballester (2018), Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2019), Kovach and Tserenjigmid (2022), Fudenberg et al. (2015).

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2 Game theory and strategic decision making

Game theory: Osborne and Rubinstein (2003), Esponda and Pouzo (2016), Salant and Cherry (2020)

Mechanism design: Border and Sobel (1987), Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez (2003), Ben-Porath et al. (2014), Mailath and Postlewaite (1990), Hellwig (2003)

Auction theory: Myerson (1981), Pesendorfer and Swinkels (2000), Bulow and Klemperer (2002) Goeree and Offerman (2003), Burkett and Woodward (2020), Gershkov et al. (2021), Bergemann et al. (2022), Levin and Peck (2023)

The theory of the firm: Grossman and Hart (1986), Levin (2003), Gans (2005), Hart and Moore (2008), Hellmann and Thiele (2015), Hellmann and Thiele (2017), Watson et al. (2020), Liu and Migrow (2022)

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